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LIONS OR JACKALS: THE FUNCTION OF A CODE OF
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To a significant degree, our concept of a code of judicial ethics is shaped by our
notion of the role of those it regulates. In the aftermath of the famous early case of
Rex v. Hampden,' the historian C. V. Wedgewood concluded that the judges of
that period, far from being "lions under the throne... grew to look like sheep or
even jackals."2 Her view of judicial subservience to royal authority under the Stuarts
is hardly undisputed, 3 but the essential substance of that controversy-the nature
and extent of judicial independence-underlies much of the present confusion over
what a judicial code of ethics ought to be.
Before proceeding any further into my subject, I should add one brief caveat:
although I am a member of the American Bar Association Special Committee on
Standards of Judicial Conduct, which is entrusted with the task of redrafting the fifty-
year-old Canons of Judicial Ethics,4 the views I express here are wholly my own and
should not be taken as those of the Committee. And although the Committee released
an Interim Report with some "specific conclusions," accompanied by a Preliminary
Statement early this summer,5 and held open hearings on the proposals at the annual
ABA meeting in August, its deliberations are "[s]ubject to reexamination in the light
of suggestions received after publication of [the] report ....- I should not, there-
fore, like to be understood as fixing in advance my response, or that of the Com-
mittee, to specific issues and problems. Rather, what I hope to offer here are some
preliminary and highly provisional observations intended to stimulate the thoughts
of others and clearly subject to reconsideration, reevaluation, and modification.
Now that the initial furor over judicial conduct raised by the nomination, rejec-
tion, and subsequent resignation of former Associate Justice Abe Fortas has turned
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to substantive proposals, I believe it is time that we directed our attention more
critically to the question of what precisely we hope to achieve in revising standards
of judicial conduct. And to my mind, the answer to that question is closely allied,
to put it somewhat bluntly, to whether we consider our judiciary, on the whole,
"lions" or "jackals."
The present Canons of Judicial Ethics dearly side with the lions. By that I mean
that the Canons view the judiciary essentially as a body of self-regulating individuals;
the Canons exhort judges to seek "independence" 7 and not to concern themselves
with "private political or partisan interests."' That, of course, has always been
our historical ideal' and as one Justice of the Supreme Court said recently, "an in-
dependent judiciary has always been one of this Nation's outstanding charac-
teristics."'
One focus of our tradition of judicial independence has been the manner in
which we choose judges. Rather than selecting them through written or oral
examinations and advancement under a rigid civil service system, we have generally
followed the practice of choosing members of the bar, hopefully of some stature, and
elevating them to the bench." Men selected in such a manner most often have
distinguished themselves professionally. In some cases this means that they have
enjoyed financial success, and in others it indicates that they have made fruitful
contributions to the common good in legal or other fields. Once on the bench, we
are accustomed to expect from our judges a breadth of vision that comports with
their independent status; and I think it not merely happenstance that it has been
men with diverse interests and backgrounds that have, as a general proposition, met
that test. Edmund Burke is supposed to have said, "Law sharpens the mind by
narrowing it." It seems to me that the words were meant less in praise of the
profession than in warning to it. Judges run the risk of becoming oracles who speak
of lectures delivered ten, twenty, or thirty years ago, adequate for their time but not
for ours. To the extent that the judicial profession becomes the daily routine of
deciding cases on the most secure precedents and the narrowest ground available,
the judicial mind atrophies, and its perspective shrinks. What impresses us about
the great jurists is not their tenacious grasp of a fine point, honed almost to in-
"ABA CANON No. 14: "Independence. A judge should not be swayed by partisan demands, public
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'ABA CANON No. 34: "A Summary of Judicial Obligation.. .. [A judge] should be . . . impartial,
fearless of public clamor, regardless of public praise, and indifferent to private political or partisan influ-
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' See U.S. CONsT. art. III, § x, granting judicial tenure during "good behavior"; Sobeloff, Striving for
Impartiality in the Federal Courts, 24 FED. B.J. 286, 288-89 (1964). See generally, J. D~wsomr, ORAcLES or
THE LAW ch. 2 (1968).
"5 Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit, 398 U.S. 74, 136 (970) (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing).
" Contrast the German practice. See W. WYRAucH, PERSONALITY OF LAWYERS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY
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visibility; it is the moment when we are suddenly made aware of the sweep and
direction of the law, and its place in the minds of men.
Hence I think that much can be said in favor of the position that we ought to
encourage, rather than discourage, judicial activities that exceed the four corners of
cases presented for disposition. There can be few qualities more conducive to
continued judicial independence than the breadth of vision acquired in differing
endeavors to advance law and justice. But having said that, I must draw back from
the most extreme implications of such a stand. We begin to qualify before we speak.
There are, as I see it, two general objectives that limit, and to some extent comple-
ment, the aim of an independent judiciary. The first is obvious: a judge's primary
concern, and hence his primary obligation, is to devote sufficient time to his judicial
duties so that justice is done to the litigants before him. Other activities, however
praiseworthy, which detract from a judge's ability to perform his judical tasks
adequately, must be relegated to a secondary position. All that follows must be
considered subject to this qualification.' 2
Few dispute that a judge must pay primary attention to judicial tasks; nor would
many argue with the proposition that a judge's extra-judicial or quasi-judicial
activities' 3 must be structured to avoid even the appearance of impropriety. In a
sense, limiting outside activities so that they will not give an appearance of partiality
or prejudgment is really but another facet of the goal of an independent judiciary.
Dependency in all its forms-from private as well as public interests-must be
avoided if the judiciary is to receive the respect and support it requires to function
effectively. Possessed of neither the purse nor the sword, it depends primarily on
the willingness of members of society to follow its mandates.' 4
The problem is to find a proper method, and even more, a proper attitude, with
which to resolve these sometimes conflicting goals into a code of ethics. One view,
vigorously championed by Dean Acheson, would strictly prohibit judges from en-
gaging in all but the most narrowly defined "legal" activities, and would enact those
prohibitions into law.'5 Others, considering the task of drafting comprehensive
and useful prohibitions both extraordinarily difficult and highly unproductive, have
concluded that "in seeking to achieve a rational course of ethical conduct, the answer
is to be found only within the conscience of the judge."'6
" See INTERIM REPORT t 1: "Judicial Duties. A judge's primary duty is to perform competently all
the duties of office imposed on him by constitution, statute, court rule, and the common law. All his
other activities are subordinate to his obligation to carry out his judicial duties." See also ABA CANON No.
6: "Industry. A judge should exhibit an industry and application commensurate with the duties imposed
upon him."
is The Interim Report follows a tripartite division of spheres of judicial activity: judicial duties are
those required of a judge to perform the functions of his office; quasi-judicial activities assist in improving
the law or judicial administration; and extra-judicial activities include civic, charitable, and other concerns.
See note 12 supra; INTEmm REPORT 1-2. I shall follow this terminology.
"See Sobeloff, supra note 9, at 286.
"See Acheson, Removing the Shadow Cast on the Courts, 55 A.B.A.J. 99 (:969).
" See Hastings, judicial Ethics as It Relates to Participation in Money-Making Activities, UzuvaRsrry
or CHCAco LA W SCHOOL CONFERENCE ON JUDICIAL ETmCS 1 (1964).
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My own views incline more towards the latter, but with significant modifications
that I suppose put me somewhere between both extremes. Some years ago, Chief
Justice Warren spoke at the Jewish Theological Seminary of America, and sug-
gested that men in all walks of life could benefit from the services of a new profession,
"counselors in ethics."'17 While it is unlikely that we will soon have a counselor
appointed to assist each judge in resolving his ethical questions, still the concept is a
provocative one, for it suggests the usefulness of an outside voice in guiding a judge's
implementation of his own ethical precepts.' And that, I think, in a nutshell, is
what a code of ethics should do. It must aim at prompting a dialogue between
a judge's own ethical sense and generally recognized communal moral standards.
In most areas of judicial ethics, unless we accept the "jackal" view of the judiciary
and opt for wholesale prohibitions, we will be unable to draft rules sufficiently precise
to capture the variety of human endeavor, and to sift each instance of participation
for potential ethical problems. We will simply have to accept broad statements to
the effect that a judge's first obligation is to do justice to the litigant before him, and
that he should not divert "substantial" amounts of time to other activities; we
cannot expect to spell out how many hours a day he must spend in one activity or
another.
The concept of a code of ethics as an invitation to a dialogue between the con-
science of a dedicated judge and communal standards is not, however, necessarily an
exclusive one. As in the course of interpretation of the antitrust laws, where the
"rule of reason" has given way to per se prohibitions in instances in which the harm
is great and the benefit small,' 9 we may, without emulating the all-inclusive character
of a penal code, reasonably prohibit specific conduct. The aim is to create prophylactic
rules in instances in which it is clear that the danger to the judiciary's reputation and
performance will outweigh any useful by-products2 The Interim Report, for ex-
ample, not only continues the preexisting prohibitions against the practice of law,"1
but extends the per se prohibition to arbitration, 2 nonfamily trusteeships, 23 and
business enterprises.' In each instance, the direction has been from general state-
-
1 Remarks of Chief Justice Warren, Louis Marshall Award Dinner, Nov. xx, x962 (mimeographed
copy). For news reports, see N.Y. Times, Nov. x, 1962, at x, col. 3.
" Cf. Frankel, judicial Ethics and Discipline for the 1970s, 54 JUIJCATURE 18, 20 (1970), suggesting
the usefulness of outside review of a judge's decisions on ethics; Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?,
37 TXAs L. REV. 657, 675 (1959): "[T]here is always a shortage of wise men."
"
9 See P. ARsEA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 303, 348 (1967).
"In the similar context of congressional ethics, a recent study concluded that "Properly conceived,
conflict-of-interest regulation does not condemn bad actions so much as it erects a system designed to
protect a decision-making process. It is preventive and prophylactic. Its aim is not detection and punish-
ment of evil, but providing safeguards which lessen the risk of undesirable action." AssociAToN OF THn
BAR OF THE CITY OF NEw YORK SPECIAL COMmITTEE ON CONGRESSIONAL ETHIcs, CONGRESS AND THE PUBLIC
TRUST 39 (,970).
"
1 ABA CANON No. 3x; INrTEum REPoar 9.
sa INTEIm REPORT 9.
5 5 Compare INERim' REPORT 4 with ABA CANON No. 27.
=' Compare Irsuasm REPORT 6 with ABA CANON No. 25. The Judicial Conference of the United
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ments to highly specific conclusions.
I should emphasize that formulation of per se rules is not only for the benefit of
litigants; judges too yearn for the safe harbor of a certain rule. What we must
realize, however, is that increasing specificity and certainty do not necessarily connote
progress; applied in a broadside and indiscriminate manner, specific rules and pro-
hibitions could threaten the capacity of the judiciary to foster and maintain diverse
activities and interests. An area in which this stricture seems particularly applicable
is that involving demands made on a judge's time by useful and important activities
intended to promote judicial administration. One could take the position that since
judicial tasks might be slighted, quasi-judicial and extra-judicial activities should be
abandoned altogether, especially since drafting a specific rule permitting some
quasi-judicial activities seems virtually impossible. Yet this would, I submit, be the
worst of all possible worlds, for it would place a premium on judicial myopia in an
age that incessantly demands more independence and more understanding to solve
the increasingly complex and sensitive issues our society leaves to be settled by litiga-
tion. In addition, I fear such an approach would deprive the judicial reform movement
of many of its ablest supporters.
One can see somewhat similar problems in the financial area. If we are to
continue to select judges from among leading members of the bar, some of them
are bound to have acquired substantial financial interests. While it is reasonable and
compelling that they be asked to confine their investments to enterprises not
often likely to require disqualification,2 5 and to disqualify themselves when they do
have an "interest" in a controversy,26 complete divestiture, or complete disclosure
of all assets (as opposed to earnings27 ), would cause some highly qualified individuals
to pause before accepting judicial appointment.28 It is a simple, practical reflection of
our society that men possessed of stature, ability, and strong character will not in-
States, at its September 17-18, x963, meeting, adopted the following resolution: "RESOLVED: No Justice
or judge appointed under the authority of the United States shall serve in the capacity of an officer, director,
or employee of a corporation organized for profit."
25 See ABA CANONS No. 26; Isrrimue REPoRT 6(b).
"
5See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1964); N.Y. JUDImcARY LAw art. 2, § 14 (McKinney 1968); ABA CANON
No. 29; INTEREm REPORT 8.
"
TThe Interim Report requires, for the first time, that a judge publicly disclose all compensation
received from outside activities. I,,rrElma REPORT 7- On June so, 1969, Chief Justice Earl Warren
(as he then was) announced that the Judicial Conference of the United States had limited outside com-
pensation to that approved by the judicial council of each circuit and made a matter of public record.
In addition, each judge was to file a statement of his assets and income. The approval requirement
was suspended at the Oct. 31, 1969, session of the Judicial Conference, pending completion of the work
of the ABA Committee on Standards of Judicial Conduct. However, an Interim Advisory Committee,
appointed in December 1969 by Chief Justice Warren Burger, has continued to give advisory opinions on
extra-judicial activities. At the March 16-17, 1970, session, the Conference approved a limited public
disclosure of compensation and organizational positions held. A decision on further reporting of assets was
again deferred pending revision of the Canons of Judicial Ethics by the ABA Committee.
"' The California Supreme Court, in City of Carmel-by-the-Sea v. Young, 2 Cal. 3 d 259, 466 P.2d
225, 85 Cal. Rptr. 47 (970) (en banc), held that a California statute requiring public office holders
(including judges) to file annual statements of investments, was an overbroad invasion of the right of
privacy, and therefore unconstitutional.
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frequently prosper financially. It will not do to discourage such men from aspiring
to the bench. And given what I believe is the universal desire of judges I have
known to avoid even the suspicion of a conflict of interest, I believe the benefit to be
gained by disclosure or divestiture small in relation to the likely harm caused the
judiciary by implementing either course. We would be placing the judiciary in the
dangerous position of perhaps saving its honor at the expense of its independence.
And the benefits, I should think, would be minimal. Whatever corrupt judges may
exist would file misleading reports. We would probably create a yearly flurry in the
popular press over particular judges, permitting the bar and the public the unusual
pleasure of seeing courthouse gossip spread across the pages of the daily paper.
The better course, to my mind, is to continue to choose good men, provide them
with a body of ethical standards to which they may repair and then, in all but the
obvious cases where per se treatment is justified, trust to the character of those we
have selected. I find myself in substantial agreement with Judge Edwards that the
members of the judiciary with whom I have come into contact in more than twenty
years on the bench are, on the whole, a sober and honest group, far removed from
the "jackals" at whom procrustean limitations are usually directed29 I would suggest
that it is more in keeping with the genius of our judicial tradition to continue to treat
our judges as "lions," and to expect them to submit more readily to ethical dialogues.
There are times when we need men who can feel and understand what goes on in
the world about them; we shall not find such men in a gray "bureaucracy" divorced
from all outside activities and interests." And there are times, I might add, when we
need men who are not afraid to roar should the occasion demand it.
"' Edwards, Commentary on Judicial Ethics, 38 FoRarHA L. Rv. 259, 26r (x969). See also Rifkind,
A Judge's Nonjudicial Behavior, 38 N.Y.S.B.J. 22 (1965); NV. NVEYRAuCH, PRsoNALITrY oi LAwyaaRs: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF SUt7ECTIVF FACTORS IN LAW, BASED ON INTERViEWS WiTH GERMAN LAwynas
(1964).
"0 Edwards, supra note 29, at 275.
